Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two freelance journalists, Spencer Woodman and George Joseph, brought separate actions at the Michigan Court of Claims against the Michigan Department of Corrections (the MDOC), arguing that the MDOC wrongfully denied their requests under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiffs sought video and audio recordings of a prisoner altercation that resulted in the death of inmate Dustin Szot. The MDOC denied their FOIA requests, claiming the records were exempt from disclosure. Plaintiffs and the MDOC both moved for summary judgment. The Court of Claims ordered the MDOC to disclose the audio recording to plaintiffs and to produce the videos for an in camera review. The trial court permitted the MDOC to submit the videos in a format that obscured the faces of the employees and prisoners in the videos to protect those individuals. However, the MDOC provided the unredacted videos for in camera review. The Court of Claims ultimately ordered the MDOC to disclose the unredacted videos to plaintiffs. The MDOC moved for reconsideration, arguing that it did not need to disclose the videos or, alternatively, that it should have been allowed to redact the videos by blurring the faces of the individuals in the videos. The Court of Claims denied the motion but nevertheless permitted the MDOC to make the requested redactions and permitted plaintiffs’ counsel to view both the redacted and unredacted videos. Plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s reduced amount of attorney fees and the denial of punitive damages. The MDOC cross-appealed, challenging only the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs prevailed in full and thus were entitled to attorney fees under FOIA. The Michigan Supreme Court determined plaintiffs prevailed under MCL 15.240(6) because the action was reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure of the records and because plaintiffs obtained everything they initially sought; accordingly, the court was required to award reasonable attorney fees. Furthermore, pro bono representation was not an appropriate factor to consider in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees; accordingly, the Court of Claims abused its discretion by reducing the attorney-fee award to plaintiffs' law firm on the basis of the firm's pro bono representation of plaintiffs. View "Woodman v. Department Of Corrections" on Justia Law

Carrie Pueblo brought an action against her former domestic partner, Rachel Haas seeking joint custody and parenting time for a child whom Haas conceived through in vitro fertilization and gave birth to in 2008, during the parties’ relationship. Haas moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the parties had never married and Pueblo had no biological or adoptive relationship to the child, Pueblo lacked standing to sue and also failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. After Haas moved for reconsideration, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice. Pueblo then filed her own motion for reconsideration, arguing that she had standing as a natural parent, despite the lack of genetic connection, following the Court of Appeals decision in LeFever v. Matthews, 336 Mich App 651 (2021), which expanded the definition of “natural parent” to include unmarried women who gave birth as surrogates but shared no genetic connection with the children. Pueblo also argued the trial court order violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection, as well as those of the child. Furthermore, Pueblo argued that any dismissal should have been without prejudice. The trial court denied reconsideration, distinguishing LeFever on the ground that Pueblo had not given birth to the child. Pueblo appealed, reasserting her previous arguments and further asserting that the equitable-parent doctrine should extend to the parties’ relationship, which had been solemnized in a civil commitment ceremony when it was not yet legal in Michigan for same-sex partners to marry. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the trial court. Because Michigan unconstitutionally prohibited same-sex couples from marrying before Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US 644 (2015), the Michigan Supreme Court narrowly extended the equitable-parent doctrine as "a step toward righting the wrongs done by that unconstitutional prohibition. A person seeking custody who demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties would have married before the child’s conception or birth but for Michigan’s unconstitutional marriage ban is entitled to make their case for equitable parenthood to seek custody." The trial court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for that court to apply the threshold test for standing announced here. View "Pueblo v. Haas" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs brought this action after the defendant modified a storm water drainage system, allegedly causing flooding onto their property. The plaintiffs raised two distinct claims that remained at issue on appeal: a claim under the sewage-disposal-system- event (SDSE) exception to governmental immunity under the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), and a common-law trespass-nuisance claim seeking injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed both claims as untimely under the applicable three-year statute of limitations. Like the Court of Appeals, the Michigan Supreme Court disagreed, holding the SDSE claim, which sought relief only in connection with flooding that occurred within the three-year window, was timely. However, unlike the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that because the defendant was immune with respect to the plaintiffs’ common-law trespass-nuisance claim, that claim was properly dismissed. In light of this holding, the Court vacated as unnecessary the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trespass-nuisance claim was timely. Finally, because the plaintiffs only sought injunctive relief in connection with that claim, their request for an injunction was invalid. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant with respect to the plaintiff’s SDSE claim, affirmed with respect to the common-law trespass-nuisance claim, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sunrise Resort Association, Inc. v. Cheboygan County Road Commission" on Justia Law

Candi Ottgen and her husband brought a medical malpractice action against Abdalmaijid Katranji, M.D., and others, alleging that Katranji had negligently performed two thumb surgeries on her, first on May 1, 2017, the second July 23, 2017. Plaintiffs filed their action on April 11, 2019, focusing their complaint on the first surgery, but they did not attach an affidavit of merit (AOM) to the complaint as required by MCL 600.2912d(1). On May 9, 2019, defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to Scarsella v. Pollak, 461 Mich 547 (2000), which held that filing a medical malpractice complaint without an AOM was ineffective to commence the action and thereby toll the two-year statutory limitations period. Plaintiffs responded by filing an amended complaint with an AOM that had purportedly been executed on January 30, 2019, but was not attached to the original complaint because of a clerical error. Plaintiffs also separately requested permission to make the late filing and contended that it related back to the original complaint. The trial court held that Scarsella was inapplicable because the AOM was completed when the original complaint was filed and its omission from the filing was inadvertent. The trial court also permitted plaintiffs to file their late AOM and allowed it to relate back to the April 2019 complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Scarsella applied and, accordingly, that plaintiffs’ complaint was untimely with regard to the first surgery, rendering the April 2019 complaint ineffective and leaving nothing for the subsequently filed May 13, 2019 amended complaint to relate back to. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded Scarsella was erroneously decided and failed to survive a stare decisis analysis, and it was therefore overruled. "Filing an AOM under MCL 600.2912d(1) is not required to commence a medical malpractice action and toll the statutory limitations period. Instead, the normal tolling rules apply to medical malpractice actions, and tolling occurs upon the filing of a timely served complaint. A failure to comply with MCL 600.2912d(1) can still be a basis for dismissal of a case; however, the dismissal cannot be based on statute-of-limitations grounds." Because the courts below did not consider the nature of dismissals for violations of MCL 600.2912d(1), the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Ottgen v. Katranji" on Justia Law

Reyes Galvan and Minhwa Kim sued Yam Foo Poon, Hwai-Tzu Hong Poon, and Daniel Poon alleging fraud, misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, silent fraud, innocent misrepresentation, loss of consortium, and breach of a warranty deed. In 2017, plaintiffs bought a condominium in Ann Arbor from defendants, and defendants transferred title to plaintiffs via a warranty deed. The deed warranted, among other things, that pursuant to MCL 565.151, the property was “free from all incumbrances.” While renovating the condominium, plaintiffs learned of several issues with the property, including that there was no proper firewall between their condo and the neighboring units, and that one of the defendants had signed a unit-modification form indicating that a wall had been moved and that a neighboring unit encroached on the upstairs bathroom of plaintiffs’ unit. Because the absence of a firewall violated the city’s building code, the City of Ann Arbor sued plaintiffs and their adjoining neighbors to enforce the code and require installation of firewalls. Plaintiffs were ordered to pay $18,000, in part to bring the walls of their unit into compliance with the building code, and they also spent additional funds to remediate other problems with the property. During a jury trial, defendants moved for a directed verdict on plaintiffs’ breach-of-warranty claim, arguing that the building code violations were not an encumbrance. The trial court agreed and directed verdict in favor of defendants on this claim. The jury subsequently found in favor of plaintiffs regarding their claims of silent fraud and loss of consortium. Galvan appealed the directed verdict, and the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the building code violations constituted an encumbrance in violation of the warranty deed. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding that a violation of a building code at the time of sale, not yet subject to any official enforcement action, was not an encumbrance. View "Galvan v. Poon" on Justia Law

MSSC, Inc., sued Airboss Flexible Products Co., alleging anticipatory breach of contract and seeking to enforce a purchase order between the parties after Airboss threatened to stop filling orders unless MSSC agreed to a price increase. Airboss supplied products to MSSC, and MSSC used those products to manufacture parts for their customers. The parties’ purchase order for the Airboss products was identified as a “blanket” order that listed the parts to be supplied but did not include specific quantities. Instead, the purchase order indicated that quantities would be based on the needs of an MSSC customer. MSSC was obligated to create and send “releases” per the terms and conditions, but neither the purchase order nor the terms and conditions obligated MSSC to send any number of firm orders to Airboss—either as a raw number or as a percentage of MSSC’s total need. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of MSSC, finding that the contract was a requirements contract and was likely enforceable. Airboss moved for summary judgment, arguing that the purchase order failed to satisfy the statute of frauds of the Uniform Commercial Code, MCL 440.1101 et seq. In response, MSSC moved for summary judgment, arguing that the blanket purchase order was a requirements contract that satisfied the statute of frauds. The trial court granted MSSC’s motion, concluding that because the purchase order was identified as a “blanket” order, it contained a “quantity term” that satisfied the statute of frauds. Airboss appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Contrary to the lower courts, the Michigan Supreme Court found the parties entered into a release-by-release contract, which allowed Airboss to stop selling parts to MSSC. View "MSSC, Inc v. Airboss Flexible Products Co." on Justia Law

Drago and Blaga Kostadinovski brought a medical malpractice action against Steven Harrington, M.D. and Advanced Cardiothoracic Surgeons, PLLC, asserting six specific theories with respect to how the doctor breached the standard of care throughout the course of Drago’s mitral-valve-repair surgery in December 2011, during which Drago suffered a stroke. Plaintiffs timely served defendants with a notice of intent (NOI) to file suit, timely served the complaint, and timely served the affidavit of merit. Following the close of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs’ experts were unable to validate or support the six theories asserted by plaintiffs in the NOI, affidavit of merit, and complaint. Plaintiffs agreed to the dismissal of their existing, unsupported negligence allegations and complaint but moved to amend the complaint to assert a new theory. The court denied the motion to amend the complaint, reasoning that amendment would be futile given that the existing NOI would be rendered obsolete because it did not include the new theory. Plaintiffs appealed and defendants cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the trial court for it to apply MCL 600.2301 in considering whether plaintiffs should be allowed to amend the NOI. In a footnote to the opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs’ argument that MCL 600.2912b simply required the service of an NOI before suit was filed and that once a compliant and timely NOI is served, as judged at the time suit is filed and by the language in the original complaint, the requirements of the statute have been satisfied. On remand, the trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion to amend, concluding that amendment would be futile and that amending the complaint would contravene MCL 600.2912b. Plaintiffs appealed. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded MCL 600.2912b did not apply where a plaintiff seeks to amend their complaint against an already-named defendant after suit has already commenced. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Kostadinovski v. Harrington" on Justia Law

Soaring Pine Capital Real Estate and Debt Fund II, LLC, filed suit against Park Street Group Realty Services, LLC; Park Street Group, LLC; and Dean Groulx, alleging multiple counts of breach of contract and fraud. Soaring Pine lent Park Street $1 million to “flip” tax-foreclosed homes in Detroit. The mortgage note had a stated interest rate of 20%, but there were fees and charges associated with the loan that, if considered interest, pushed the effective interest rate above 25%. The mortgage note also contained a "usury savings clause" stating that the note should not be construed to impose an illegal interest rate. After paying more than $140,000 in interest on the loan, Park Street discontinued further payments, arguing Soaring Pine violated the criminal usury statute, MCL 438.41, by knowingly charging an interest rate exceeding 25% and therefore was barred by the wrongful-conduct rule from recovering on the loan. Soaring Pine countered that the fees and charges associated with the loan were not interest and that the note had a usury savings clause that prevented it from charging a usurious rate. Soaring Pine further argued that, assuming it had engaged in criminal usury, it could still recover the loan principal and would only be precluded from collecting the interest. The trial court agreed with Park Street that the purported fees and expenses tied to the loan were really disguised interest, and there was no question of fact that Soaring Pine charged a criminally usurious interest rate. However, the court agreed with Soaring Pine that the usury savings clause was enforceable and that the appropriate remedy was to relieve Park Street of its obligation to pay the interest on the loan but not its obligation to repay the principal. The Michigan Supreme Court held that in determining whether a loan agreement imposes interest that exceeds the legal rate, a usury savings clause is ineffective if the loan agreement otherwise requires a borrower to pay an illegal interest rate. Seeking to collect an unlawful interest rate in a lawsuit, standing alone, was insufficient to trigger criminal liability under Michigan’s criminal usury statute. The appropriate remedy for a lender’s abusive lawsuit is success for the borrower in that lawsuit and appropriate civil sanctions, not a criminal conviction for usury. The Court reversed the appellate and trial courts to the extent they were inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holdings, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Soaring Pine Capital Real Estate v. Park Street Group Realty" on Justia Law

Adora Wilmore-Moody, individually and as next friend of her minor son, brought an action against Mohammed Zakir and Everest National Insurance Company, alleging that Zakir had negligently rear-ended her vehicle, and sought personal protection insurance benefits from Everest for the injuries she and her son incurred as a result of the collision. Everest did not pay the benefits but instead rescinded plaintiff’s policy on the ground that plaintiff had failed to disclose that she had a teenaged granddaughter living with her when she applied for the insurance policy. Everest then brought a counterclaim seeking declaratory relief and moved for summary judgment of plaintiff’s claim against it under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that it was entitled to rescind plaintiff’s policy because she had made a material misrepresentation in her insurance application. The trial court granted Everest’s motion. After this ruling, Zakir also moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff was barred from recovering third-party noneconomic damages from him under the Michigan no-fault act because once Everett rescinded plaintiff’s insurance policy, she did not have the security required by statute at the time the injury occurred. The trial court granted Zakir summary judgment too. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Everest, reversed as to Zakir, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Zakir appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court: an insurer’s decision to rescind a policy post-accident does not trigger the exclusion in MCL 500.3135(2)(c). "Rescission is an equitable remedy in contract, exercised at the discretion of the insurer, and does not alter the reality that, at the time the injury occurred, the injured motorist held the required security. Rescission by the insurer post-accident is not a defense that can be used by a third-party tortfeasor to avoid liability for noneconomic damages." View "Wilmore-Moody v. Zakir" on Justia Law

Elia Companies, LLC, filed suit against the University of Michigan Regents, alleging breach of contract; violations of Michigan’s anti-lockout statute; breach of covenant for quiet possession; constructive eviction; conversion; and unjust enrichment. In 2013, plaintiff entered into a 10-year lease with defendant to obtain space at the Michigan Union for establishing a coffee shop. In March 2017, defendant disclosed its plans to renovate the Union. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the parties’ lease required that they negotiate a relocation of the leased premises. However, defendant terminated the lease on April 20, 2018, based on plaintiff’s alleged default and ordered plaintiff to vacate the premises. Plaintiff filed this action in August 2018, and defendant, over plaintiff’s objection, filed a notice of transfer removing the case to the Court of Claims pursuant to MCL 600.6404(3) and MCL 600.6419(1) of the Court of Claims Act (the COCA). Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff’s action had to be dismissed because plaintiff failed to comply with the notice and verification requirements of MCL 600.6431 of the COCA. The Court of Claims agreed and dismissed plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The panel affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s ancillary claims on governmental-tort-immunity grounds but reversed the dismissal of plaintiff’s contract claim. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals erred when it excused plaintiff’s failure to timely comply with MCL 600.6431. “All parties with claims against the state, except those exempted in MCL 600.6431 itself, must comply with the requirements of MCL 600.6431.” Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the Court of Claims for reinstatement of summary judgment granted in defendant’s favor. View "Elia Companies, LLC v. University Of Michigan Regents" on Justia Law