Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
People Of Michigan v. Carson
Michael G. Carson was convicted by a jury in the Emmet Circuit Court of multiple charges, including safebreaking, larceny, and conspiracy, after being accused of stealing money and personal property from his neighbor, Don Billings. Billings had allowed Carson and his girlfriend, Brandie DeGroff, access to his house to help sell items online, but later discovered that valuable items and cash were missing. Carson was arrested, and his cell phone was seized and searched, revealing incriminating text messages. Carson's defense counsel moved to suppress these messages, arguing the seizure of the phone without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, but the motion was denied.Carson was sentenced to various prison terms for each conviction. He appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not challenging the search warrant's adequacy. The Court of Appeals reversed his convictions, ruling the search warrant was too broad and the good-faith exception did not apply. They also found trial counsel ineffective for not seeking exclusion of the phone's contents based on the warrant's broadness. The prosecution appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the search warrant was insufficiently particular under the Fourth Amendment, as it allowed a general search of the phone's contents without meaningful limitations. However, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, concluding that Carson's counsel's performance was not constitutionally deficient given the evolving nature of Fourth Amendment law regarding digital data. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment on this point and remanded the case for consideration of Carson's remaining issues. View "People Of Michigan v. Carson" on Justia Law
In Re Barber/Espinoza Minors
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) petitioned the Lenawee Circuit Court, Family Division, to take jurisdiction over two minor children, CB and ME, and terminate the parental rights of their mother after CB alleged sexual abuse by two of the mother's male friends. CB claimed the mother was aware of the abuse and allowed it in exchange for drugs. The court authorized the petition, suspended the mother's parenting time, and ordered the children to remain with their father. At the combined adjudication and termination hearing, CB testified about the abuse, and the court found her testimony credible, concluding that grounds for adjudication and termination existed.The trial court terminated the mother's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), and (j), finding that termination was in the children's best interests. The mother appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that aggravated circumstances were not present under MCL 722.638(1)(a)(ii) because the mother was not the perpetrator of the criminal sexual conduct. The court also found that the trial court erred by not advising the mother of her right to appeal the removal order.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that under MCL 712A.19a(2)(a), DHHS is not required to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family when there is a judicial determination of aggravated circumstances as provided in MCL 722.638(1) and (2). The court concluded that the mother subjected CB to aggravated circumstances by facilitating criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, even though she did not personally commit the act. The court also found that the trial court's failure to advise the mother of her right to appeal the removal order was plain error but did not affect her substantial rights. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's order terminating the mother's parental rights. View "In Re Barber/Espinoza Minors" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law, Juvenile Law
Rayford v. American House Roseville I LLC
A certified nursing assistant was hired by a nursing care facility in February 2017. A week into her employment, she signed an acknowledgment that included a 180-day limitations period for bringing any employment-related claims. She reported inappropriate behavior by upper management and alleged retaliation by her manager. She was terminated in July 2017 and filed a complaint in April 2020, alleging various claims including violations of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA).The Macomb Circuit Court granted the defendant's motion for summary disposition, dismissing the plaintiff's claims based on the 180-day limitations period in the acknowledgment. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the shortened limitations period was unconscionable. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, relying on precedent that upheld such limitations periods in employment contracts.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the contractual limitations period was enforceable. The Court held that while contractually shortened limitations periods are generally permitted, they require close judicial scrutiny when included in non-negotiated, adhesive employment agreements. The Court overruled previous decisions that did not apply this scrutiny and reinstated the framework from Camelot Excavating Co. and Herweyer v. Clark Hwy Servs., which require a reasonableness analysis for such limitations periods.The Court concluded that the 180-day limitations period in the plaintiff's employment agreement was adhesive and warranted close judicial scrutiny. The case was remanded to the Macomb Circuit Court to develop a full record and determine the reasonableness of the shortened limitations period and whether it was unconscionable. If found unreasonable or unconscionable, the statutory three-year limitations period would apply. View "Rayford v. American House Roseville I LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Labor & Employment Law
Janetsky v. County Of Saginaw
An assistant prosecuting attorney, Jennifer Janetsky, filed a lawsuit against Saginaw County, the Saginaw County Prosecutor’s Office, John McColgan, and Christopher Boyd. Janetsky alleged violations of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), public policy violations, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. The case stemmed from Janetsky’s handling of a criminal sexual conduct prosecution and subsequent alleged retaliatory actions by her supervisors, McColgan and Boyd, after she reported concerns about a plea agreement.The Saginaw Circuit Court granted summary disposition to the Saginaw County Prosecutor’s Office on all claims, to all defendants on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and to McColgan on the intentional-tort claims, but denied the motion for the remaining claims. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment in part, ordering summary disposition in favor of all defendants on the remaining claims. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider unresolved issues. On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed in part, ordering summary disposition on the intentional-tort and public-policy claims in favor of all defendants and on the WPA claim in favor of Saginaw County.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s denial of summary disposition. The Supreme Court determined that Saginaw County was an employer under the WPA, allowing Janetsky to sue under the Act. The Court also established a test for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, remanding the case to the trial court to apply this test. Additionally, the Court found genuine issues of material fact regarding Janetsky’s intentional-tort claims, including false imprisonment and assault and battery, sufficient to defeat summary disposition. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Janetsky v. County Of Saginaw" on Justia Law
Davis v. BetMGM, LLC
Jacqueline Davis filed a lawsuit against BetMGM, LLC, in the Wayne Circuit Court, claiming fraud, conversion, and breach of contract after winning over $3 million on BetMGM's online gambling platform. BetMGM approved her withdrawal of $100,000 but later suspended her account, citing a game malfunction that erroneously credited her winnings. BetMGM refused to remit the remaining winnings, leading Davis to file a complaint with the Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) and subsequently in court.The Wayne Circuit Court granted BetMGM's motion for summary disposition, ruling that the Lawful Internet Gaming Act (LIGA) preempted Davis's claims and that the MGCB had exclusive jurisdiction over online gambling disputes. The court relied on caselaw interpreting the Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Act (MGCRA) and administrative rules under the LIGA, concluding that the LIGA precluded inconsistent common-law claims. Davis's motion for reconsideration was denied.The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision in a split decision. The majority agreed with the lower court's reasoning, while the dissent argued that the MGCB did not have the authority to resolve individual patron disputes and that Davis's claims were not inconsistent with the LIGA. The dissent also noted that the MGCB's role was limited to investigating violations of the LIGA and did not extend to adjudicating disputes between patrons and licensees.The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the LIGA did not abrogate common-law claims of fraud, conversion, and breach of contract. The court clarified that the correct principle to apply was abrogation, not preemption, and found no clear legislative intent to abrogate these common-law claims. The court also determined that Davis's claims were not inconsistent with the LIGA, as the MGCB did not have the authority to resolve such disputes. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Davis v. BetMGM, LLC" on Justia Law
People v. Tadgerson
A prisoner was observed by a corrections officer receiving a crumpled piece of paper from another inmate. The officer demanded the prisoner hand over the paper, which contained two orange strips later identified as Suboxone, a controlled substance. The prisoner did not have a prescription for Suboxone. Initially, the prisoner tested positive for Suboxone, but a retest was negative. The prisoner was charged with being a prisoner in possession of a controlled substance (PPCS).The 85th District Court bound the prisoner over for trial, concluding there was sufficient evidence for probable cause without ruling on whether PPCS required a mens rea element. The Manistee Circuit Court denied the prisoner's motion to include a mens rea element in the jury instructions, relying on a previous case, People v Ramsdell, which held PPCS to be a strict-liability offense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, agreeing that PPCS is a strict-liability crime.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine if PPCS is a strict-liability offense or if it requires a mens rea element. The Court held that MCL 800.281(4) does not plainly impose strict liability and that MCL 8.9(3) applies, requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant acted with intent, knowledge, or recklessness. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "People v. Tadgerson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Jackson v. Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative
Plaintiffs, who owned real property in Southfield, Michigan, became delinquent on their property taxes between 2012 and 2014. Oakland County foreclosed on their properties under the General Property Tax Act (GPTA). The plaintiffs had the opportunity to redeem their properties by paying the delinquent taxes, but they failed to do so. Consequently, the properties were foreclosed, and the city of Southfield exercised its right of first refusal to purchase the properties for the minimum bid, which included the unpaid taxes and associated fees. The properties were then conveyed to the Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative (SNRI).The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in the Oakland Circuit Court, alleging violations of their constitutional rights, including the Takings Clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants, citing lack of jurisdiction, lack of standing, and res judicata. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. However, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co, which held that retaining surplus proceeds from tax-foreclosure sales violated the Takings Clause of the Michigan Constitution.On remand, the trial court again granted summary disposition to the defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that Rafaeli applied retroactively and that the plaintiffs had valid takings claims. The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that a taking occurs when a governmental unit retains property without offering it for public sale and the value of the property exceeds the amount owed in taxes and fees. The Court also held that MCL 211.78m, as amended, applies prospectively, while MCL 211.78t applies retroactively but does not govern this case. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative" on Justia Law
People v. Masi
Carl T. Masi was charged with multiple counts of first-degree and second-degree criminal sexual conduct involving three minors, AU, SU, and MU, who alleged that Masi began sexually assaulting them when they started living with him. Masi sought to introduce evidence related to the complainants' sexual histories, specifically that AU had viewed pornography during prior sexual abuse by her uncle. The trial court denied Masi's motion, ruling that this evidence was inadmissible under the rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j, and People v Morse, because there was no conviction related to the prior abuse.The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that evidence of AU viewing pornography during prior sexual abuse was "sexual conduct" under the rape-shield statute and thus inadmissible under Morse. Masi then sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the plain meaning of "sexual conduct" in the rape-shield statute includes both voluntary and involuntary behavior, thus encompassing nonvolitional acts such as involuntarily viewing pornography during sexual abuse. The Court overruled Morse to the extent that it required a conviction for prior sexual conduct to be admissible. Instead, the Court established a new standard requiring an in camera evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of such evidence based on specific factors, including whether the prior act occurred, its similarity to the current allegations, its relevance, necessity to the defense, and whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the lower courts' decisions and remanded the case to the Macomb Circuit Court to apply the new standard in an in camera hearing. View "People v. Masi" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
C-Spine Orthopedics PLLC v. Progressive Michigan Insurance Company
Jose Cruz-Muniz and Sandra Cruz were injured in a car accident in 2018 and received treatment from C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC. They assigned their rights to seek personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits from Progressive Michigan Insurance Company to C-Spine. C-Spine then assigned its accounts receivable, including the claims for unpaid benefits, to several factoring companies. Progressive argued that C-Spine lacked standing to seek payment because it had assigned its rights to the factoring companies. C-Spine countered with signed counter-assignments from the factoring companies, purportedly restoring its right to bring suits. The trial court initially denied Progressive's motion but later granted it, concluding that C-Spine lacked standing when the complaints were filed.In a separate case, Parie Wallace was injured in a bus accident and received treatment from several providers, including C-Spine. Wallace assigned her rights to seek PIP benefits to these providers. She later filed a lawsuit against Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART) seeking payment of PIP benefits. SMART argued that Wallace could not bring the action because she had assigned her rights to the providers. The trial court allowed Wallace to obtain revocations of the assignments, which she did, and then denied SMART's motion for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Wallace was not the real party in interest when she filed her complaint and that her claims were barred by the one-year-back rule.The Michigan Supreme Court held that both C-Spine and Wallace had standing to file their lawsuits but were not the real parties in interest at the time they filed suit because they had assigned their claims. The Court ruled that defects in real party in interest status could be cured after filing a lawsuit. In C-Spine's case, the Court of Appeals' judgment was affirmed on alternate grounds, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. In Wallace's case, the Court of Appeals' judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, and the case was remanded for the trial court to consider whether equitable rescission was warranted and whether the real party in interest defect could be cured. View "C-Spine Orthopedics PLLC v. Progressive Michigan Insurance Company" on Justia Law
Wallace v. Smart
C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC, filed two actions in the Macomb Circuit Court against Progressive Michigan Insurance Company to recover personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits for care provided to Jose Cruz-Muniz and Sandra Cruz, who were injured in a 2018 car accident. Jose and Sandra assigned their rights to seek PIP benefits to C-Spine, which then assigned its accounts receivable, including these claims, to factoring companies. Progressive moved for summary disposition, arguing C-Spine lacked standing as it had assigned its rights. The trial court initially denied but later granted the motion, concluding C-Spine lacked standing when the complaints were filed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding C-Spine retained its claims for PIP benefits under MCL 500.3112.Parie Wallace filed an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART) seeking PIP benefits after being injured in a bus accident. Wallace assigned her rights to PIP benefits to her medical providers. SMART moved for summary disposition, arguing Wallace could not bring the action due to the assignments. The trial court allowed Wallace to obtain revocations of the assignments, which she did, and then denied SMART’s motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding Wallace was not the real party in interest when she filed her complaint and that her claims were barred by the one-year-back rule.The Michigan Supreme Court held that both C-Spine and Wallace had standing to file their lawsuits but were not real parties in interest at the time of filing due to their assignments. The Court ruled that defects in real party in interest status could be cured after filing. In C-Spine’s case, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was affirmed on alternate grounds, and the case was remanded to the trial court to consider whether C-Spine could cure the defect. In Wallace’s case, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, and the case was remanded for the trial court to consider whether equitable rescission was warranted and whether the real party in interest defect could be cured. View "Wallace v. Smart" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Insurance Law